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The Copyrightability of Computer
Program Screen Displays
by LAURIE ZEEB KULLBY*
Introduction
The computer industry is no stranger to the harsh reality of
competition and the process of incremental evolution.' Com-
puter companies thrive on ideas developed by others in the in-
dustry.2 Expressions, not ideas, are protected by copyright,' so
the objective is to build on others' ideas. Copyright protection
of the computer program, a concept mainly developed in the
past decade, has been the primary source of protection for com-
puter software companies.4 However, with technological devel-
opments continuing in the industry, and innovative features on
computer programs continuing to expand, the question arises
B.A., Northwestern University;, Member, Third Year Class. The author
wishes to express her appreciation to Keith S. Kullby for his creative ideas, enthusias-
tic support, and never-ending patience.
1. Williams, A Threat to Future SQftware, BYTE, Jan. 1986, at 6. The author de-
fines "incremental evolution" as "the process of gradual improvement of a product
type that eventually leads to a more robust, useful product." The author further ex-
plains, "[I]f companies are afraid to go to market with what they think are incremen-
tal, but distinct, improvements on a basic design, we will become a stagnant industry
bounded by the usual and comfortable." See also Pearson, The Last Days qf the
Clones? - Protecting the 'Look and Feel' of Sqftware, 3 COMPUTER L. & PRAC. 103
(1987).
2. See Note, Video Voodoo: Copyright in Video Game Computer Progrms, 38
FED. COMM. L.J. 103,128 (1986) (explaining the stepping stone theory of improvement
in the computer industry - "each progressive modification or improvement in com-
puter programming ideas is based on ideas spawned in earlier programs"). An exam-
ple of this stepping stone theory can be seen in Ashton Tate's Framework program,
which evolved from the ideas behind such programs as the VisiCalc spreadsheet,
Socrim's Supercalc, and Mitch Kaper's Visiplot. Williams, supra note 1, at 6.
3. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954). 1 M. NIM-
MEn, NIMmER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.03[D], at 2-34 (1985).
This fundamental distinction (between idea and expression), arguably re-
quired by the freedom of speech guarantee of the First Amendment, consti-
tutes not so much a limitation on the copyrightability of works, as it is a
measure of the degree of similarity which must exist as between a copyright-
able work and an unauthorized copy, in order to constitute the latter an
infringement.
Id
4. See infra notes 47-54 and accompanying text.
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L. J.
whether copyright protection for computer programs alone is
sufficient to meet today's needs.
Software companies are focusing their attentions and efforts
on improving the "look and feel"' of computer programs.6
More user friendly screen displays are being developed. Many
of these programs can now be operated by the user through
"icons," or command symbols on the screen, rather than by the
keyboard.
One of the more recent debates regarding copyright protec-
tion in the computer industry centers on the copyrightability of
audiovisual screen displays of computer programs.7  Computer
program developers are asserting copyright protection over
these screen displays under the copyright of the underlying
computer program, and are attempting to assert copyright pro-
tection even more directly through a separate copyright of the
screen display. This is an expansion of the copyright protection
for computer programs which in the past has centered solely on
the computer program.8
Apple Computer was one of the first companies to market a
5. "Look and feel" is a concept commonly used to describe how a computer pro-
gram interacts with its user. Software companies want to make their computer pro-
grams more user friendly, so their main concern is the outward performance or "look
and feel" of their programs.
Two authors define the "look and feel" of a computer program as "its 'design, pres-
entation and output as experienced by the user,' including the various observable at-
tributes of a program such as commands, graphics, sounds, symbols, sequences,
arrangement, and more general aesthetic qualities experienced by the user." Com-
ment, Protecting the "Look and Feel" of Computer Softtvare, 1 HIGH TECH. L. J. 411,
416 (1986). Screen displays are part of the "look and feel" of computer programs.
This note will limit its focus solely on the issue of the copyrightability of computer
program screen displays, but in its analysis it recognizes the importance of the rest of
the "look and feel" of computer programs. See infra notes 142-47 and accompanying
text.
6. See Comment, supra note 5, at 412. The hot issue in the future most likely
will center around protecting the "look and feel" of programs rather than the code.
See also supra note 1. As the personal computer boom ends, computer companies are
having to compete harder for business, and the user friendly concept becomes one of
the bigger selling points.
7. Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal.
1986); Digital Communications Assocs. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449
(N.D. Ga. 1987). See also Foster & Ranney, Apple Forces GEM Change, Infoworld,
Oct. 7, 1985, at 1, col. 2; Bransfield, Visual Copyrights, BYTE, Apr. 1986, at 14; Davis,
"Look and Feel" Isn't Everything in This Case, BYTE, July 1986, at 22.
8. See, e.g, Synercom Technology, Inc. v. Univ. Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003
(N.D. Tex. 1978); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d
Cir. 1983); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775 (C.D. Cal.
1983). See infra notes 47-54 and accompanying text.
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computer program operated through the use of icons.9 With
the Apple Macintosh computer, instead of using the keyboard
to input commands, the user moves a hand-held box called a
"mouse" that, in turn, controls an arrow on the display screen
which points to various icons or command symbols on the
screen. For example, a trash can is an icon on the Macintosh
screen which stands for "delete."
In October, 1985, Apple instigated this new copyright attack
in the computer industry when it forced Digital Research, Inc.
(DRI) to change some of its screen displays on its Graphics En-
vironment Manager (GEM) applications programs. Using video
game copyright law as precedent, Apple asserted that DRI's
icons were substantially similar to those on Macintosh.10
A year later, copyright protection for computer program
screen displays made its debut in the legal system. In October,
1986, the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of California upheld copyright protection for computer
program screen displays in the landmark case Broderbund
Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc."' The court ruled that
while the computer screen display itself was not separately
copyrighted, copyright protection was afforded to it through
the underlying computer program copyright.'2
Much of the computer industry reacted negatively to Bro-
derbund, 13 the main criticism being that such copyright protec-
tion is a monopoly for the few computer companies that first
developed the concept and a deterrent to future computer
software development. 14 The Broderbund holding goes against
9. The Apple Macintosh interface was actually created by computer scientist
Alan Kay of Xerox. Caruso, Apple Shuts Window on Look-Alike Icons, ELECrRoNIcS,
Oct. 7, 1985, at 16. Many other computer programs, including the Xerox Star, use
icons in their screen displays.
10. Against the threat of a lawsuit from Apple, DRI signed an agreement with
Apple under which DRI agreed to stop selling its current release of GEM which Ap-
ple considered to be substantially similar to the Macintosh's "look and feel." DRI also
agreed to modify its GEM program, subject to Apple's conditions and approval, to pay
Apple damages in an undisclosed amount, and to provide discounted programming
services to Apple. Caruso, supra note 9 at 17; see also supra note 7 and cases cited
therein; see also Comment, supra note 5, at 416 (a more detailed discussion of the
dispute).
11. 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
12. Id. at 1133.
13. See Williams, supra note 1; Davis, supra note 7.
14. In fact, Unison argued in another suit against Broderbund for alleged re-
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the traditional "stepping stone" theory15 of growth in the com-
puter industry. Also, competition in the computer software in-
dustry itself might decrease, and new companies will be
discouraged from entering the business.'6
More recently, in Digital Communications Associates, Inc. v.
Softklone Distributing Corp.,"7 the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia disagreed with
Broderbund, holding that the copyright of a computer program
does not extend protection to the screen displays generated
by the program.'" Instead, the Digital court upheld the com-
puter screen display's own separately registered copyright as a
"compilation."' 9
Since Digita, the Copyright Office has refused to separately
register textual computer screen displays,2° holding that the
computer program copyright is sufficient protection for the
straint of trade that copyright protection for the appearance of a screen display
amounted to a "virtual monopoly." Comment, supra note 5, at 419 n.49.
See Leeke, Software Copyright Court Ruling Stirs Debate, PC WEEK, Dec. 9,1986, at
59, 68.
It might dangerously inhibit some good trends in our industry - the natural
development of standards and the ability of people to take advantage of com-
patibility to sell new products that do new things. If the world is learning to
press F1 for help, it's nice to have those functions in the next product.
Id See also Williams, supra note 1; Clark, Software's 'Look'Ruled Copyrightable, San
Francisco Chron., Oct. 14, 1986, at 23, col. 5.
15. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
16. Bulkeley, Courts Expand the Copyright Protection of Software, but Many
Questions Remain, Wall St. J., Nov. 18, 1986, at 35, col. 4. Pearson, supra note 1, at
104.
17. 659 F. Supp. 449 (N.D. Ga. 1987).
18. Id. at 455-56.
19. Id. at 463.
20. The Copyright Office distinguishes textual screen displays from graphic and
pictorial screen displays. A textual display, like the one in Digita4 is one which has
text, or words, while a graphic or pictorial display has shapes and figures (icons).
Computer program screen displays may contain text, graphics or pictures. For in-
stance, icons are graphics, while the screen displays in Digital contained only text.
There is debate over whether such a distinction need be made with computer pro-
gram screen displays for registration purposes. In the past, the Copyright Office has
registered video game screen displays which are graphic and pictorial screen displays.
Perhaps the Copyright Office is implying that it will permit registration of graphic or
pictorial computer program screen displays.
This author believes no such distinction should be made with computer program
screen displays. Video game screen displays have a different purpose than ordinary
computer program screen displays. See infra notes 90-104 and accompanying text.
Accordingly, the Copyright Office should not look to its treatment of video game
screen displays in this instance. Furthermore, such a distinction will only further con-
fuse this already complex issue. Ronald J. Palenski of the Computer Software and
Services Industry Ass'n (ADAPSO) also argues that no distinction should be made
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screen displays generated therefrom.2 ' On September 9, 1987,
the Copyright Office held a hearing to look further into
whether computer screen displays should be separately copy-
rightable.2 The Copyright Office's position at the time of the
hearing was that textual screen displays do not need separate
registration because "there is no authorship in ideas, or in the
format or arrangement of the text, and... any literary author-
ship in the screen display would presumably be covered by the
underlying computer program.' ' 3
The issue of the copyrightability of computer screen displays
has become quite entangled.' It must be conclusively decided
not only whether copyright protection should be given to com-
puter screen displays, but whether such protection should come
from the copyright of the underlying computer program, or
separately, in a distinct copyright of the screen display, in-
dependent of the computer program copyright.
This note argues that copyright protection for computer
program screen displays should come from the copyright of the
underlying computer program. A single registration of a com-
puter program will sufficiently protect the associated screen
since both text and graphics are created in the same way. 34 Pat. Trademark & Copy-
right J. (BNA) 507 (1988).
21. 33 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 613 (1987).
22. 34 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 326 (1987). The hearing focused
specifically on "(1) whether the [Copyright] Office should register any screen displays
separately from the underlying computer programs that generate them; and (2) what
the Office should require as the deposit if any registration is made for screen displays
either separately or as a part of a computer program." Id.
The Copyright Office's decision has not yet been announced at this note's publica-
tion date. See 34 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 507 (1988) for a report on the
various discussions held at this hearing. Representatives from Apple Computer, Lo-
tus Development Corp., various computer trade associations and private attorneys
took part in the debate.
23. 34 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 507 (1988).
24. In the latest development, Apple filed suit in March 1988 in the Northern
District of California against Microsoft Corp. and Hewlett-Packard Co. Apple con-
tends that the screen displays of Microsoft's Windows program and Hewlett-Packard's
New Wave program are substantially similar to the Macintosh screen display. Apple's
motives behind this suit go further that merely stopping Microsoft and Hewlett-Pack-
ard. A favorable ruling would halt all computer program developers, including IBM,
which is itself currently working on a new program that will use screen display graph-
ics. Apple's suit has the whole computer industry intimidated and anxiously worried
about what they should do with their current computer program development
projects. Schlender, Miller and Carroll, Apple's Copyright Lawsuit is Seen as Effort
to Lock in Technical Lead, Wall St. J., Mar. 21,1988, at 25, col. 4. See also Clark, Steve
Jobs Questions Apple's Lawsuit, San Francisco Chron., Mar. 30, 1988, at C1, col. 1.
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display. Separate copyright registration of the computer screen
display is inappropriate and unnecessary.
In support of this argument, this note will first contrast the
copyright law of computer programs with that of video games,
where the display screen has always been separately copy-
righted. This note will discuss how the underlying program,
rather than the visual display, is the primary level of expres-
sion in an ordinary computer program. On this basis, single re-
gistration of the computer program is sufficient copyright
protection for the computer program screen display.
Second, this note argues that in analyzing copyright protec-
tion of the computer screen display under the copyright of the
underlying computer program, it is inappropriate for courts to
focus solely on the screen display. The computer screen display
is only part of the computer program. Accordingly, the whole
computer program, including the literal aspects, or the code it-
self, must be considered in such a determination.25
This note will propose judicial guidelines for determining
copyright infringement of computer screen displays. Courts
should refer qualitatively to the whole computer work, rather
than just the display screen, in determining copyright infringe-
ment under the computer program copyright. By focusing only
on the screen displays in their determinations of copyright in-
fringement, the Broderbund court and computer company ad-
vocates are not necessarily looking at the qualitative aspects, or
expression, of the computer programs.
Finally, this note points out that not all the material on
screen displays will necessarily be copyrightable. Under the
idea/expression doctrine, screen displays and icons should be
protected only to the degree their expression is unique and
nonutilitarian. Computer icons, as indistinguishable symbols,
are not copyrightable.
I
Survey of Computer Copyright Protection
A. Introduction to Technical Terms
A computer program is, in simplest terms, a set of instruc-
tions to a computer which 'causes the computer to perform
25. See, ag., Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1245 (3d
Cir. 1986); Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1133 (N.D.
Cal. 1986).
(Vol. 10:859
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some operation. 26 There are basically two types of computer
programs. The first type includes the application programs
which interact directly with a person and use the computer as a
tool to solve particular applied problems.' Video games and
computer word processing software programs are types of ap-
plications programs.1 The second type is systems software,
which consists of programs that are needed to make a computer
system function. They actually help the computer run the ap-
plications programs.29
It must be noted at the outset that there is no direct corollary
between computer programs and screen displays. One can copy
a computer program code and come up with a different screen
display.3° By contrast, many different computer programs can
produce the same audiovisual display.31
Copyright protection is issued under the Copyright Act
(Act). 2 Because of the statutory nature of this protection, a
work must first fit under the Act as a work of authorship
before copyright infringement may even be considered. Section
102(a) lists the types of works which are protected: literary
works, musical works, dramatic works, pantomimes and cho-
reographic works, pictorial, graphic and sculptural works, mo-
tion pictures and other audiovisual works, and sound
recordings. 3
A computer program has copyright protection as a literary
work.34 Screen displays have been recognized as audiovisual
26. D. SPENCER, THE ILLUSTRATED COMPUTER DICTIONARY 156 (rev. ed. 1983).
27. 1& at7.
28. Hereinafter, to distinguish between video games and other non-video game
applications programs, video games will be called as such, and all other applications
programs will be referred to as applications or computer programs.
29. L.J. Ku'TTEN, COMPUTER SOFTWARE: PROTECTION/LIABiLITY/LAW/FORMS,
§ 1.02, at 1-3. Systems software is often referred to as the operating system of the
computer. These programs tell the computer how to function - how to read and
store data, how to put information into the computer's memory, etc. IcE
30. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775, 778
(C.D. Cal. 1983); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Co., 714 F.2d 1240, 1245
(3d Cir. 1983). These cases are typical of the ones involving computer program copy-
right infringement. Two computer programs with different screen displays were
found to have substantially similar codes.
31. See, e.g, Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., 797 F.2d at 1244; Midway Mfg.
Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741, 742, 749-53 (N.D. 111. 1983); Stern Elecs. v. Kaufman,
669 F.2d 852, 855 (2d Cir. 1982).
32. 17 U.S.C. § 101-810 (1982).
33. Id § 102(a). This list is not conclusive. See 1 M. NiMMER, supra note 3.
§ 2.03[A], at 2-25.
34. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
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works.35 Individual shapes, or objects on screen displays might
also be considered pictorial or graphic works.3
Copyright infringement can always be disproved by the de-
fense of an independent creation. 7 "One is always free to
make the machine do the same thing as it would if it had the
copyrighted (program) placed in it, but only by one's own crea-
tive effort rather than piracy. '
B. The CONTU Report and the 1980 Amendments
In the Copyright Acts of 1909 and 1976, copyright protection
for computer programs was implicitly found under the category
of literary works.' The roots of the real inquiry into computer
copyright protection came, however, in 1974 when Congress
created the National Commission on New Technological Uses
of Copyrighted Works (CONTU). ° After investigating the
copyrightability of computer programs, the Commission
presented its Final Report in 1978, which Congress adopted
35. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1244; Broderbund, 648 F. Supp. at 1131. Video game cases
also recognize video screen displays as audiovisual works. Williams Elec. v. Artic
Int'l., Inc., 685 F.2d 874 (3d Cir. 1982); Midway Mfg. Co., 564 F. Supp. at 749.
Audiovisual works are defined in § 101 of the Act as "works that consist of a series
of related images which are intrinsically intended to be shown by the use of
machines."
36. Pictorial and graphic works are defined in § 101 as "two-dimensional and
three-dimensional works of fine, graphic, and applied art, photographs, prints and art
reproductions, maps, globes, charts, technical drawings, diagrams, and models." 17
U.S.C. § 101 (1982). See Comment supra note 5, at 434-35 (further discussion of this
idea).
For a contrasting opinion, see Amicus Curiae Brief filed in Broderbund and re-
printed in part Davis, Special Problems in "Look and Feel" Copyright Cases, PRACT.
L. INST. 741 (1986). The brief authors argue that:
the output on the screen is not a copy of the program, nor an audiovisual
work, nor is it a protected pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work. It is merely
the intermediate step in a functional process, carried out by a computer pro-
gram... [I]t is only a process, not a protectible work. Id. at 745.
37. Id. at 747. Fred Fischer, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1924)
("the law imposes no prohibition upon those who, without copying, independently
arrive at the precise combination of words or notes which have been copyrighted");
see also Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1227 n.7.
38. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED
WoRKS, FINAL REPORT 21 (1978) [hereinafter CONTU REPORT].
39. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. at 54 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5667 ("The term 'literary works' does not connote
any criterion of literary merit or qualitative value: it includes catalogs, directories, and
similar factual, reference or instructional works and compilations of data.").
See also CONTU REPORT, supra note 38, at 16.
40. CONTU REPORT, supra note 38, at 1.
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fully in the 1980 Amendments to the Copyright Act.4"
Copyright protection was expressly extended to computer
programs in the CONTU Report and Congress' 1980 Amend-
ments to the Copyright Act.4 Computer program was specifi-
cally defined in Section 101 as "a set of statements or in-
structions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in or-
der to bring about a certain result."' 3 Former section 117 was
repealed and replaced with a section that gave computer own-
ers a limited right to reproduce and adapt their computer pro-
grams they bought."
The CONTU Report also recognized that computer copyright
protection was limited only to the expression of the program
and not to the ideas or methods of operation.4 Section 102(b) of
the Act thus clearly applies to computer programs: "In no case
does copyright protection for an original work of authorship ex-
tend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of opera-
tion, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in
which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in
such work."4
C. Judicial Development of Copyright Protection for Computers
The courts soon followed with their interpretation of the
copyright protection available for computer programs. In Ap-
ple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp.,47 copyright
protection was extended to the program's source and object
codes.4s The Central District Court of California in Apple Corn-
puter, Inc. v. Formula Internationa, Inc.,4 summed it up well:
it was "crystal-clear that CONTU recommended that all com-
puter programs, fixed in any method and performing any func-
tion, be included within copyright protection. ' 'so
41. Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 7, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 (codified at 17
U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 (Supp. IV 1980)).
42. CONTU REPORT, supra note 38, at 1; 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
43. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
44. i. § 117.
45. CONTU REPORT, supra note 38, at 18-19.
46. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982).
47. 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983).
48. Id at 1249. See also Midway Mg. Co., 564 F. Supp. at 750-51. A source code is
one written in a programming language, such as FORTRAN or BASIC, by humans
and entered into a computer. The computer then translates the program into object
code, or machine language. D. SPENCER, supra note 2, at 179.
49. 562 F. Supp. 775 (C.D. Cal. 1983), qff'd, 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984).
50. Id. at 781 (emphasis in original).
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While copyright protection covered a computer program's lit-
eral elements, such as the code, it was uncertain whether such
protection was also available for other elements of the com-
puter program. In Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University
Computing Co.,5 a case of first impression, the Northern Dis-
trict Court of Texas limited copyright protection to the com-
puter program's literal elements.5 The court held that input
formats used with computer programs were uncopyrightable
because the sequencing and ordering of data was deemed to be
part of an idea rather than an expression of an idea.5 As the
district court explained, "if sequencing and ordering is expres-
sion, what separable idea is expressed?""M
1. Judicial Development of Copyright Protection
for Video Games
Copyright protection for video games was developed sepa-
rately and distinctly from that of other computer programs.
The first video game cases granted copyright protection based
solely on the separate copyright of the screen display. In Stern
Electronics, Inc. v. Kaufman, 5 the Second Circuit held that the
audiovisual display of the "Scramble" video game was copy-
rightable even though the plaintiff had not registered the
underlying computer program for copyright protection.w Sub-
sequent courts continue to analyze the copyrightability of video
games through their audiovisual displays, rather than through
their computer programs.5 7
Gradually, dual protection of both the audiovisual display
and the computer program in the video game context has
evolved. Independent copyrights in the audiovisual display and
computer program were found in Midway Manufacturing Co.
v. Strohon.' However, the court decided copyright infringe-
51. 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
52. Id. at 1014.
53. Id. at 1013.
54. Id The court did acknowledge that if the expression involved "stylistic crea-
tivity above and beyond the bare expression of sequence and arrangement" copyright
protection would apply. Id
55. 523 F. Supp. 635 (E.D. N.Y. 1981), off'd, 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982).
56. 523 F. Supp. at 641-42.
57. See, e.g., Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 441-42 (4th Cir. 1986);
Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125,146-47 (D.N.J. 1982); Atari,
Inc. v N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 615-17 (7th Cir. 1982).
58. 564 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ill. 1983). In this case Defendant created a "modifica-
tion kit" called CUTE-SEE that could be used in plaintiff's PAC-MAN video game
[Vol. 10:859
1988] COMPUTER SCREEN DISPLAY COPYRIGHTABILITY 869
ment based on the copying of plaintiff's computer program,
without relying on the audiovisual display.5
These independent copyrights of the audiovisual screen and
computer program were merged by the Fourth Circuit in
Kramer Manufacturing Co. v. Andrews.6 0 The court held that
"a copyright in the audiovisual display, which display is created
by a computer program, protects not only the audiovisual from
copying, but also the underlying computer program to the ex-
tent the program embodies the game's expression." 61
The evolution of copyright protection for the video game in-
dustry shows that the courts consider the audiovisual copyright
the primary means of protection for video games, and the com-
puter program copyright as secondary.6 From the very begin-
ning courts have made this distinction with video games in
applying copyright protection."
2. Recent Judicial Development of Copyright Protection
for Computer Programs
Today, with video game copyright law firmly developed,
courts' views regarding copyright protection for software com-
puter programs have begun to change. In SAS Institute, Inc. v.
S & H Computer Systems, Inc.,64 copyright infringement was
found based on defendant's copying of both the code and the
structural details and organization of plaintiff's computer
program.'s
machines to make the PAC-MAN game more challenging. The kit included a set of 5
ROMs (Read-Only Memory chips; permanent storage chips made by the manufac-
turer that cannot be reprogrammed) that were installed in the PAC-MAN circuit
board, and CUTE-SEE graphics that were placed over the PAC-MAN trademark. I&
at 743-44.
59. Id. at 749.
60. 783 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1986).
61. ld. at 442.
62. See Id. at 441-42 ("[Ihe memory device, or computer program, is an essential
element of the audiovisual copyright .... [It] qualifies as a copy of plaintiff's audiovi-
sual work and as such is protected under the plaintiff's [audiovisual] copyright"
(emphasis in original)).
63. See, e.g., Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982) (where the
court found copyright protection for the audiovisual display of a video game which
was copyrighted, even through the underlying computer program was not copy-
righted); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125 (D.N.J. 1982);
Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 222 (D. Md. 1981).
64. 605 F. Supp. 816 (M.D. Tenn. 1985). Plaintiff had a computer software system
that performed statistical analysis.
65. Id at 822, 825-26.
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Copyright infringement based solely on the copying of the
structure and overall organization of a computer program was
found, and later affirmed by the Third Circuit in Whelan Asso-
ciates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab.'s In this case, the "overall
structural similarities" between two dental lab computer pro-
grams included the file structures, the screen outputs, and five
"subroutines" within the computer programs.67
The District Court, in Whelan, defined the "expression of
the idea" in a software computer program to be "the manner in
which the program operates, controls and regulates the com-
puter in receiving, assembling, calculating, retaining, correlat-
ing, and producing useful information either on a screen, print-
out or by audio communication." e8 This decision was the first
time a court considered a computer program's screen display in
determining copyright infringement.69 The idea of the dental
lab computer program was the efficient organization of a dental
lab. Since there were other program structures through which
this idea could be expressed, the court found that the structure
of the computer program was an expression of the idea.70
In Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc.,71 the
66. 609 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D. Pa. 1985) aff'd, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986). The the-
ory behind this holding was the "total concept and feel" test as set forth in Sid &
Marty Krofft Television Prod., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir.
1977). Under this test the substantial similarity test is applied to the intrinsic, overall
structure of a work in determining copyright infringement. Id.
67. 797 F.2d at 1228.
68. 609 F. Supp. at 1320. A similar theory that has been advanced by some writers
is the "look and feel" theory. Under this theory the substantial similarity test should
be expanded to cover the "look and feel" of the computer program. See Note, supra
note 2, at 127 n.123; see also Note, Defining the Scope of Copyright Protection for
Computer Software, 38 STAN. L. REV. 497, 531 (1986). The author proposes the "Unit
Publication Doctrine," in which computer programs and their associated screen dis-
plays are treated as a "unit publication." As the author explains, this would allow a
court to treat similarities in computer programs and screen displays as cumulative.
IC
69. The Whelan court stated in its opinion:
Tihe only conclusion to be drawn from the fact of the different copyrights
[i.e., the screen display as an audiovisual work and the computer program as
a literary work] is that the screen output cannot be direct evidence of copy-
right infringement [with respect to the computer program]. There is no rea-
son, however, why material falling under one copyright category could not be
indirect, inferential evidence of the nature of material covered by another
copyright.
797 F.2d at 1244 (emphasis in original).
70. 609 F. Supp. at 1320.
71. 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986). The Broderbund parties settled in the mid-
dle of 1987. Unison paid Broderbund an undisclosed sum of money and agreed to a
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Northern District Court of California expanded upon the idea
developed in Whelan by upholding an audiovisual copyright on
the computer program "Print Shop." The two computer pro-
grams involved allowed users to create and print out their own
"customized" greeting cards, posters, and signs from menu-
driven screens.72 The plaintiff Broderbund sued Unison under
its computer program copyright for copyright infringement of
its audiovisual displays. The court in Broderbund followed the
Whelan court's concept of computer program copyright protec-
tion.73 Such copyright protection was not limited to the literal
aspects of the 'Print Shop" computer program, but rather ex-
tended to its overall structure and organization, including its
screen displays of instructions.74
However, the Broderbund court in its analysis focused only
on the screen displays of the two programs, rather than com-
paring the two entire computer programs, including their
screen displays, as the Whelan court had.75 Perhaps the
Broderbund court did this out of confusion because plaintiffs
sued under the term "audiovisual copyright." Because the
copyright of the computer program is involved, however, all the
elements of expression in the computer program must be con-
sidered, not only the screen displays.76
Most recently, the Broderbund decision has been questioned,
and a new theory has been expounded by the Northern District
Court of Georgia in Digital Communications Associates, Inc. v.
Softklone Development Corp.77 The two computer programs in-
volved in this case were personal data communications systems
through which computers could reach information and data
stored in other microcomputers or remote mainframe com-
puters. Plaintiff's program, "Crosstalk XVI," had a "status
screen" screen display or "main menu" which contained an ar-
rangement of parameter/command terms, with values next to
them, in the upper portion of the screen. Two letters of each
permanent injunction barring it from further copyright infringement. Unison's pro-
gram was also changed so as not to be similar to Broderbund's. 34 Pat. Trademark &
Copyright J. (BNA) 277 (1987).
72. 648 F. Supp. at 1130. Menu-driven screens are screens that list all the instruc-
tion options a user can choose from. D. SPENCER, supra note 26, at 125.
73. 648 F. Supp. at 1133.
74. Id. at 1137.
75. Id.; but see Whelan, 609 F. Supp. at 1321-22; 797 F.2d at 1228-29.
76. See infra notes 131-47 and accompanying text.
77. 659 F. Supp. 449 (N.D. Ga. 1987).
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parameter/command term were capitalized and highlighted,
and the terms could be accessed by typing in those two letters.7
Plaintiff's predecessor, Microstuff, Inc., registered the com-
puter program and user manual with the Copyright Office.79 In
addition, however, Microstuff also obtained a separate copy-
right registration for its "status screen" display as a "compila-
tion of program terms.' ' 0
The Digital court found copyright protection for the screen
display based on the separate status screen copyright."1 The
district court further held, contrary to Broderbund4 that "copy-
right protection of a computer program does not extend to
screen displays generated by the program. ' a
The Digital court disagreed with Broderbund's interpreta-
tion of Whelan, arguing that "[t]he Third Circuit in Whelan
dealt only with the evidentiary use of the copying of screen dis-
plays for the purpose of establishing copying of the underlying
computer program."8 The district court in Whelan did, how-
ever, expressly discuss the similarity of the two visual screens
in its discussion of the similarities between the two programs."
If an aspect of a computer program is taken into consideration
in a decision of copyright infringement, one can logically de-
duce that that aspect of the computer program is copyright pro-
tected. Otherwise, the particular similarity would be irrelevant
in the copyright infringement analysis.
The Copyright Office's separate registration of plaintiff's
screen display in Digital was a seemingly rare and atypical inci-
dent. In the past, such a registration was not made with com-
puter program screen displays.s  Perhaps in response to
Digital, the Copyright Office stopped separately registering
textual computer screen displays as "compilations," reasoning
78. Id, at 452.
79. Id at 453.
80. Id. Registration of a work is not a requirement for obtaining a copyright. A
work is automatically copyrighted once it is in final, fixed form. Registration does,
however, provide extra "protection" - it entitles the owner to statutory damages and
attorneys fees in any judicial proceeding and establishes prima facie evidence of the
copyright's validity. Furthermore, courts often require registration in order to file a
copyright infringement action. G. DAVIS, SOFTWARE PROTECTION 81 (1985).
81. 659 F. Supp. at 462-63.
82. Id. at 455.
83. Id
84. 609 F. Supp. at 1322.
85. Telephone conversation with Virginia Giroux, attorney advisor for the Lter-
acy Section of the Examining Division of the Copyright Office (Apr. 6, 1988).
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that the screen displays were covered under the copyright re-
gistration for the underlying computer program.
[The] textual screen displays embodied within the computer
program that generates them are covered by the registration
for the programs, without either the need or justification for
separate registration for the displays. Because the displays are
considered to be an integral part of the program, the author-
ship in the displays appears to be the same as that contained in
the program. Moreover, the Copyright Office would not regis-
ter a claim in the format or layout. 86
II
Separate or Single Registration of Computer
Program Screen Displays: Looking to
The Level of Expression in a
Computer Program
Copyright protection and registration of screen displays
should be directly related to the level of expression the screen
display has in comparison to the rest of the computer program.
There are basically two copyrightable elements, or levels of ex-
pression, in computer programs: the code8 7 and the input/out-
put.se In video games, the expression in the screen displays is
considered so important that separate registration of screen dis-
plays has always existed. 9 Such is not the case with computer
programs, however.
Video game computer programs and their screen displays
serve different functions than other computer programs and
screen displays. Based on the video game's function, the main
level of expression for a video game is the visual display. 90
Other application programs, however, have more diverse func-
tions, and thus the computer program and the code are the pri-
86. 33 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 613 (1987). The Copyright Office
issued such an opinion in response to LOTUS 1-2-3's application for copyright regis-
tration of its screen displays.
87. A computer code consists of binary digits which are combined in an unique,
systematic way, giving the computer instructions. D. SPENCER, supra note 26, at 32.
88. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). Input consists of the information or data that is sent
from an external source such as a keyboard or disk drive into the computer. Output is
the end product of the computer program working with the data supplied by the user.
Output devices include the screen display, the printer, and the computer files, where
the output can be stored. D. SPENCER, supra note 26, at 99, 143.
89. See infra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
90. See Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 442 (4th Cir. 1986).
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mary level of expression. 1 Courts should treat the levels of
expression for each differently.'
A. Video Game Screen Displays
A video game, as the name implies, is a game. Copyright pro-
tection does not extend to games, as such, since they are, in es-
sence, ideas.93 However, artistic expression found within a
game is copyrightable.94 The screen display of a video game is
analogous to a game board.95 The screen display, like a game
board, is the place where copyrightable artistic expression can
be found in a video game. It is the substance of the whole com-
puter program because its distinguishing feature alone sets it
apart from other video games. 6
The visual elements of a video game constitute the entire
functional aspect of the program. Without the audiovisual dis-
play there would be no purpose or use for the video game. The
computer program of the video game centers solely on the au-
diovisual display. Courts have acknowledged this fact from the
start, granting copyright protection for video games through
the audiovisual display first, and then later upholding copyright
protection in the underlying code.9' Recently, the courts have
gone even further, merging the two independent copyrights to-
gether, and holding that copyright protection in the audiovisual
display extends also to the underlying code.9"
91. The CONTU REPORT itself proves this theory. See supra note 38. CONTU
originally decided to protect computer programs, rather than their "look and feel"
aspects. The computer program and code have been at the heart of the inquiry from
the very beginning.
92. See Amicus Curiae Brief filed in Broderbund and reprinted in part in Davis,
supra note 36, at 745, where the author argues against applying video game case law to
other computer programs.
93. Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 615 (7th Cir.
1982); Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, 611 F.2d 296, 300 n.1 (9th Cir.
1979); Chamberlin v. Uris Sales Corp., 150 F.2d 512, 512-513 (2d Cir. 1945).
94. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 3, § 2.18 (H)(3), at 2-212 (1985). See also Atari, 672
F.2d at 615. See ir fra notes 160-62 and accompanying text for further discussion of
AtarL
95. See Atari, 672 F.2d at 615.
96. See Note, Copyright Protection for Video Game&" The Courts in the Pac-Man
Maze, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 531, 556 (1983-84). The author opines that the reason many
plaintiffs chose to register copyright only in the audiovisual display is because the
specific game display sells the game and is therefore the likely subject of misappropri-
ation. Id.
97. See Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 435-36 (4th Cir. 1986); see also
supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
98. See Kramer, 783 F.2d at 441.
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B. Computer Applications Program Screen Displays
A computer applications program has a much broader pur-
pose and more output possibilities than a video game. While
the only function of a video game is to provide entertainment to
the user, a computer program is designed to provide the user
with a finished product, be it information or a printout.e The
finished product created specifically for the user through his
input, rather than the screen display, is the purpose, or essence,
of the computer program.100
The finished product is created not only by the use of the
screen display, but by other devices in the computer program
like data manipulation functions, data structures, and control
structures. 1 1 The underlying program and code are the link to
all the various structures and the organization of the computer
program, as well as to the various types of output the computer
program is able to produce.102 The program code is the primary
level of expression because without it the computer program
would not have its unique structure and organization. 08
Computer copyright protection for non-video games, there-
fore, has centered on the computer program code, since this is
the source of the computer program's expression.1 4 This prac-
tice should be continued, and the copyright on the code ex-
tended to cover the look and feel of the computer program. No
separate copyright of the screen display is necessary, as it is
with video games, for the computer program screen is not the
primary level of expression.
III
A Proposed Test for Copyright Infringement Of
Computer Programs
A. Determining Copyright Infringement
The elements of copyright infringement are copyright own-
99. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
100. I.
101. Davis, supro note 7, at 387.
102. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text. The computer applications pro-
gram takes the input and creates the user's output, according to the user's instruc-
tions. Output, Including the screen display, could not be created without the
computer program.
103. Davis, supra note 7, at 387.
104. See aupra notes 47-54 and 93 and accompanying text.
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ership by the plaintiff and copying by the defendant.1 5 Copy-
ing is difficult to prove by direct evidence.l1e Instead, courts
decide this second element circumstantially by proof of access
to the allegedly infringed copyrighted work and substantial
similarity between the two works at issue.107 Evidence of access
is usually easily demonstrated by the defendant's own admis-
sion or use of the copyrighted work,108 or by evidence that
plaintiff's work is widely available on the market.' °9 The more
difficult task is determining whether defendant's work is sub-
stantially similar to plaintiff's copyrighted work."l0 As will be
seen later, the substantial similarity test is even more difficult
to apply with computer program copyright infringement.
The traditional substantial similarity test was set forth in
Arnstein v. Porter,"' and later modified in Sid & Marty Krofft
Television Productions v. McDonald's Corp."'2 The test is di-
vided into the "extrinsic test" and the "intrinsic test."" 3 Under
the extrinsic test the trier of fact receives expert testimony to
determine whether there is substantial similarity in the under-
lying ideas of the two works."4 If he finds that the defendant
did copy plaintiff's idea, the trier of fact next applies the intrin-
sic test to determine whether there is substantial similarity be-
tween the forms of expression of the two works.115 This part of
the test has been called the "audience test""'  or the "ordinary
105. 3 M. NimmER, NimmER ON COPYRGHT § 13.01, at 13-3 (1985). See, e.g., Atari,
672 F.2d at 614; Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prod. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d
1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977).
106. See Broderbund Software, Inc., v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1135
(N.D. Cal. 1986). The court recognized the rarity of direct proof, but found sufficient
direct evidence of copying to establish infringement.
107. Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970);
Atari, 672 F.2d at 612; Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1231-32; Ferguson v. Nat'l Broadcasting Co.,
584 F.2d 111, 113 (5th Cir. 1978).
108. See, e.g., Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1232 (where the court found defendant had ac-
cess to plaintiff's computer program on the basis that plaintiff's program was used in
defendant's company and defendant worked as a sales representative for plaintiff).
109. See, eg., Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World, Inc. 547 F. Supp. 222, 227 (E.D. Md.
1981) (where the court found access through the evidence that plaintiff's "Asteroids"
video game had been widely distributed on the market).
110. See infra notes 111-18 and accompanying text.
111. 154 F.2d 464, 468-69 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 851 (1947).
112. 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
113. Id. at 1164-65; see also Aliotti v. R Dakin & Co., 831 F.2d 898, 900 (9th Cir.
1987).
114. 562 F.2d at 1164.
115. See, e.g., Broderbund, 648 F. Supp. at 1135-37.
116. Hearn v. Meyer, 664 F. Supp. 832, 845 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); American Greeting
Corp. v. Easter Unlimited, Inc., 579 F. Supp. 607, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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lay observer test,"1 7 since the standard for determining sub-
stantial similarity between the expressions is that of a repre-
sentative audience or ordinary lay observer who knows about
such works. No expert testimony is allowed in applying the in-
trinsic test.118
1. Application of the Substantial Similarity Test:
Computer Programs v. Screen Displays
Courts have always experienced difficulty in applying the
substantial similarity test to computer programs. The problem
lies in the intrinsic test because ordinary lay people are not nor-
mally familiar with computer programs, and, therefore, are un-
able to compare the two computer programs without expert
help." 9 Many courts have ignored the traditional bifurcated
test, and applied their own version of the substantial similarity
test. For instance, in Midway Manufacturing Co. v. Strohon, 1
the court relied solely on expert testimony in applying the sub-
stantial similarity test. A more recent example of this is Whe-
lan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc.,21 where the
Third Circuit used an integrated substantial similarity test.22
The court stated that the ordinary observer test was "of doubt-
ful value in cases involving computer programs on account of
the programs' complexity and unfamiliarity to most members
of the public."' 2 The court of appeals went on to state that the
ordinary observer test was, therefore, not useful and, in fact,
"potentially misleading" with complex subjects like computer
programs.'
Some courts, abandoning the traditional substantial similar-
ity test, use a "percentage of similarity" test,2'2 in which the
court finds substantial similarity when a percentage of the code
117. Whlan, 797 F.2d at 1232; Atari, 672 F.2d at 614; Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu
Ltd., 360 F.2d 1021, 1023 n.2 (2d Cir. 1966); Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F.2d 1, 18
(9th Cir. 1933).
. 118. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prod. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164
(9th Cir. 1977).
119. See, e.g., Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1232-33.
120. 564 F. Supp. 741, 752-53 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
121. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986).
122. Id at 1233. Under this integrated substantial similarity test both lay and ex-
pert testimony were admissible. I&L
123. I. at 1232.
124. IdS at 1233.
125. Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741, 752 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Williams
Elecs. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 873 (3d Cir. 1982).
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on the defendant's computer program is substantially similar to
the plaintiff's program. The courts in Midway Manufacturing
Co. v. Strohon,12 and Williams Electronics v. Artic Interna-
tional, 1' used this varied theme, but no set percentage was de-
lineated as establishing substantial similarity.1M
Application of the substantial similarity test to screen dis-
plays, by comparison, is much simpler. The trier of fact can
easily apply the intrinsic test by comparing the two screens
side-by-side.'m People are familiar with video games, and
can distinguish similarities and differences between different
games without expert help.13°
2. The Problem and a Proposed Test
The ease of applying the traditional substantial similarity
test to screen displays, combined with the difficulty of applying
the same test to computer software programs, may wrongly in-
fluence the courts to look less at the computer program when
determining copyright infringement, and instead look to the
screen display. 3 1 In Whelan, the court of appeals discussed the
problems that can occur. Since screen displays are clearer and
simpler to understand, the trier of fact might be influenced dis-
proportionately. 132 The parts of a computer program that re-
late to the screen display are often such a minor part of the
entire computer program that the screen display might Say lit-
tle at all about the underlying computer program.1l 3 The Whe-
lan court opined, however, that "screen outputs are not so
enticing that a trier of fact could not evaluate them rationally
126. 564 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
127. 685 F.2d 870 (3d. Cir. 1982).
128. The Midway court found substantial similarity based in part on the evidence
that 89% of the 16,000 bytes in the PAC-MAN video game ROMS were identical in the
defendant's CUTE-SEE video game's ROMs, and that over 97% of the instruction lo-
cations, considered in isolation, were also identical. 564 F. Supp. at 752-53.
In Williams, the court considered in its analysis the evidence that over 85% of the
contents of the memory devices in-plaintiff's "Defender" game and defendant's "De-
fense Command" game were identical. 685 F.2d at 876 n.6.
129. See, e.g., Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp. 672 F.2d 607
(7th Cir. 1982) (where the 7th Circuit compared the audiovisual screens of the Pac-
Man and K.C. Munchkin video games). The court had no trouble applying the sub-
stantial similarity test to the two video games' characters. Id.
130. See id. at 615-18.
131. See, e.g., Broderbund4 648 F. Supp. at 1136-37.
132. Whzelaa 797 F.2d at 1245.
133. I&
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and with a cool head."'' 4 The defendants' protection against
such disproportionate influence, reasoned the court, is the "am-
ple opportunities [they have] to advance their arguments before
the court."'"
The Whelan court's dicta is unrealistic, however. Earlier the
court acknowledged the trend of courts in abandoning the
traditional substantial similarity test with computer programs
due to their complexity."s This trend can easily go further and
follow the copyright law of the video game cases, where the au-
diovisual display is the primary subject of copyright protection.
The Broderbund decision itself disproves the Whelan court's
dicta. The district court failed to apply the substantial similar-
ity test correctly by ignoring the computer program code and
focusing solely on the audiovisual display in its determina-
tion. 3 7 This new copyright protection for the overall structure
and organization of a computer program can lead to abuse of
the audiovisual display copyright when the screen display is not
a substantial portion of plaintiff's work. s' s The focus in a copy-
right infringement action is on the overall similarities rather
than the differences."' s The whole computer program includ-
ing the literal aspects, or the code itself, must be considered in
determining copyright infringement.14°
3. The Qualitative Substantial Similarity Test
In Whelan, the court of appeals disputed the idea that an
entire computer program must be considered in the substantial
similarity test, finding no such requirement in other areas of
copyright infringement.' 4 ' Rather, the Whelan court insisted
that courts must make a qualitative, not quantitative, decision.
"[T]he relevant inquiry cannot ... be the purely mechanical
one of whether most of the programs' steps are similar.
134. I
135. IS
136. Id at 1232-33.
137. Broderbund, 648 F. Supp. at 1136-37. See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying
text.
138. See Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1238 n.34.
139. Atari, 672 F.2d at 616-17.
140. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1245. See also Atari, 672 F.2d at 616-17. While the court
might still have reached the same result when considering the underlying computer
program, the result would be different if the similarities did not relate to matter
which did not constitute a substantial portion of plaintiffs' work. See also infia note
144.
141. 797 F.2d at 1245.
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Rather, because we are concerned with the overall similarities
between the programs, we must ask whether the most signifi-
cant steps of the programs are similar."'142
The Whelan court is correct in its statement that the judg-
ment must be qualitative rather than quantitative.143 How-
ever, computer programs vary tremendously in the qualitative
importance of the display in regard to the "expression" of the
program. Thus, courts should always start out comparing the
whole program to determine the significance of the screen dis-
play.' " Plaintiffs should not be allowed to claim infringement
solely on the substantial similarities of the screen display, such
as the Broderbund plaintiffs did.
A visual display may be good probative evidence of computer
program copyright infringement, but it is not conclusive.'
There are too many other possibilities for copyright infringe-
ment with computer programs.14 If the screen displays of com-
puter programs are similar, the court should not stop there, but
should probe further to find other, more substantive, similari-
ties, and then weigh the similarities along with the qualitative
importance of those similarities.147
IV
The Lack of Expression in Screen Displays and
Computer Icons
A. The Elements of a Screen Display
To receive any copyright protection, a screen display must
first fulfill the "work of authorship" requirement and be con-
sidered subject matter of copyright protection.1" Words, titles
142. Id at 1246.
143. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter's., 471 U.S. 539, 565-66 &
565 n.8 (1985); see also Atari, 672 F.2d at 618 ("When analyzing two works to deter-
mine whether they are substantially similar, courts should be careful not to lose sight
of the forest for the trees.").
144. See Aliotti v. R. Dakin & Co., 831 F.2d 898, 901 (9th Cir. 1987) ("Similarity of
expression exists only when the total concept and feel of the works' is similar."); see
also Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1245-46.
145. See supra note 69.
146. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
147. 'See Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1245-46 ("Because all steps of a computer program are
not of equal importance ... we must ask whether the most significant steps of the
programs are equal.").
148. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text; see also 37 C.F.R. § 202.1 (1985);
1 M. NMER, supra note 3, § 2.15, at 2-178 to 2-185.
[Vol. 10:859
1988] COMPUTER SCREEN DISPLAY COPYRIGHTABILITY 881
and short phrases are not included as subject matter entitled to
copyright protection. 49 Symbols and graphics do, however, sat-
isfy the requirement1i 0
Copyright protection does not apply to a screen display as a
whole. Rather, only those aspects of a screen that are unique
and distinguishable from the ideas or utilitarian functions un-
derlying the screen display are copyrightable.'5
B. Icons as "Scenes a Faire"
The concept involved here is the idea-expression merger,
codified in section 102(b) of the Copyright Act of 1976.1m
Where idea and expression merge, no copyright monopoly is
available.153 The classic case setting forth the idea-expression
merger concept was Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kal-
pakian, m the "jewelled bee case." The court held that because
the "idea" and "expression" of a jewelled bee were inseparable,
copying the expression was allowed. Otherwise, the copyright
owner would have an impermissible monopoly over the idea.M
A related concept is the scenes a faire approach to literary
works. Scenes a faire are "incidents, characters or settings
which are as a practical matter indispensable, or at least stan-
dard, in the treatment of a given. topic. '"se Copyright protec-
tion is not given to scenes a faire, since doing so would give one
a monopoly over the idea. Instead, such symbols receive pro-
149. 37 C.F.R. § 202.1 (1985); 1 M. NIMER, supra note 3. § 2.16, at 2-186 to 2-187.
Words, titles and short phrases, instead, receive their copyright protection through
the code since they usually appear in the exact form in the source code. Symbols or
graphics, however, do not appear in the source code in the same exact manner and,
thus, are not protected by a copyright on the computer program. Icd
150. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
151. Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 913 (2d Cir. 1980); 17 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) (1976).
152. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1976).
153. Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 741-42 (9th Cr.
1971); Atar, 672 F.2d at 614-15; Broderbund, 648 F. Supp. at 1131-32.
154. 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971). In this case, a manufacturer of gold jewelled pins
in the shape of a bee attempted to stop another manufacturer from making jewelled
bee pins that were allegedly similar. The district court found, and the appellate court
affirmed, "that defendants' jewelled bees were not 'substantially similar' to plaintif's
bees, except that both 'do look like bees."' IdE at 739.
155. Id. at 742.
156. Atari, 672 F.2d at 616. See also 3 M. NummER, supra note 105, § 13.01 (A)(1), at
13-32 to 13-33 ("similarity of expression, whether literal or nonliteral, which necessar-
ily results from the fact that the common idea is only capable of expression in more or
less stereotyped form will preclude a finding of actionable similarity").
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tection only from virtually identical copying."5
Courts have frequently applied this concept in the video
game cases.'m Copyright protection for the video game screen
display is limited to the "extent the particular form in which it
is expressed (shapes, sizes, colors, sequences, arrangements and
sounds) provides something new or additional over the idea."' 9
In Atari, Inc. v. North American Phillips Consumer Electronics
Corp.,1 the court found the maze, scoring table, tunnel exits
and use of dots in the Pac-Man video game to be scenes a
faire. '6 The Pac-Man characters, on the other hand, were pro-
tected because their traits and antics made them distinguish-
able from other games with similar ideas. 6 2
Applying the idea-expression dichotomy and scenes a faire
concepts to screen displays of computer programs, copyright
protection is not available for their complete form. Only those
icons or symbols, that are expressions distinguishable from the
idea of the screen display should be protected.'" Computer
software icons are analogous to video game symbols and charac-
ters, and courts should apply the same test to icons in deciding
copyright infringement.
Icons, as they appear today, are not distinctive enough to re-
ceive copyright protection. For instance, the Macintosh icon
for "delete," the trash can, is a basic, simple graphic design. In
comparison with the Pac-Man figure, it has no traits or charac-
teristics that distinguish it. Apple, in effect, is monopolizing
the idea of using a trash can for delete. Icons must have artistic
characteristics that set them apart from the idea of the symbol
in order to attain copyright protection.
C. Screen Displays and Icons as Utilitarian Works
Works, to the extent that they are primarily utilitarian or
functional, also receive no copyright protection.'6 ' Protection is
157. Atari, 672 F.2d at 614.
158. See, e.g., Frybarger v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 812 F.2d 525, 530 n.3 (9th Cir.
1987); Universal City Studios v. Nintendo Co., 615 F. Supp. 838, 858-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1985);
Midway, 564 F. Supp. at 747; Atari, 672 F.2d at 614; Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World,
547 F. Supp. 222, 228 (D. D.C. 1981).
159. Atari, 672 F.2d at 615-16.
160. 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1982).
161. Id. at 617.
162. Id.
163. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
164. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1976). 1 M. NIMMMER, supra note 3, § 2.18(B), at 2-197.
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afforded only to the extent that a work "contains some element
that, physically or conceptually, can be identified as separable
from the utilitarian aspects of that article."'I'
The Supreme Court in Baker v. Selden 1' set forth this doc-
trine when it ruled that plaintiff's bookkeeping forms were not
copyrightable because a system of bookkeeping could not be
used without copying them. "[W]here the art it teaches cannot
be used without employing the methods and diagrams used to
illustrate the book... such methods and diagrams are to be
considered as necessary incidents to the art, and given there
with to the public."'""
It is for this reason that typeface,"" as well as mechanical
aspects and shapes of games,' are not copyrightable. Charts
and forms are also considered utilitarian works if they are the
basis of an underlying system.170
To the extent that a screen display contains such a utilitarian
work, no copyright protection should be afforded. Screen dis-
plays, such as the LOTUS spreadsheet, thus should not be copy-
rightable, since the spreadsheet is the integral part of the
underlying system, or the idea behind LOTUS.' 7'
Conclusion
Copyright protection for non-video game computer program
screen displays is a newly developed issue. As computer soft-
ware companies have developed more programs with more
The classic case is Baker v. Selden, where the court refused to give copyright protec-
tion to an accounting book that contained blank form pages with a system of certain
ruled lines and headings. The court held that the blank forms were part of the idea of
the book - the purpose of function of the book. 101 U.S. 99, 101-03 (1879).
165. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 55, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADM.N. NEWS 5659, 5668.
166. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
167. Id. at 103.
168. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 3, § 2.15, at 2-180 to 2-185; 37 C.F.R. § 202.1 (1985);
Eltra Corp. v. Ringer, 579 F.2d 294, 296-98 (4th Cir. 1978).
169. 1 M. NIMMER upra note 3, § 2.18[H], at 2-214; Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy
Corp., 630 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1980). Such aspects include buttons, levers and steering
controls. Id at 906.
170. See, e.g, Taylor Instrument Cos. v. Fawley-Brost Co., 139 F.2d 98,100 (7th Cir.
1943).
171. 33 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 613 (1987). The Copyright Office
recently denied LOTUS' application for registration of the screen displays of LOTUS
1-2-3, reasoning that the screen displays were covered under the computer program
registration. Id at 613-14.
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user-friendly screens, concern has developed over the protec-
tion afforded these screens.
Courts must approach this new concept with an understand-
ing of the differences between ordinary computer programs
and video game computer programs. The basis of, and reason-
ing behind, the copyright protection already afforded ordinary
computer programs must not be forgotten by the courts. The
Broderbund court failed to apply the traditional computer pro-
gram copyright protection concepts and instead jumped over
into the realm of law under video games.
The proper approach for courts to take in computer copy-
right infringement cases involving screen displays would be to
compare the similarity of the code, followed by a determination
of the extent to which the computer program is expressed
by the visual display. The similarities should be compared
qualitatively. If the screen display is only a minor part of the
computer program in comparison with the other parts of the
computer program, the similarities found between the two
screens should be only of small importance to the court. Fi-
nally, courts should protect the screen displays and the icons
contained therein only to the degree that their expression is
unique and nonutilitarian.
In the area of high technology, legal answers are not easily
found or understood. The courts should not take the easy road
and substitute a simpler test for determining copyright in-
fringement of computer programs. Doing so will only lead to
abuse in the computer industry.
Finally, the courts must remember that the purpose of com-
puter programs is to aid the computer user. Allowing tradi-
tional audiovisual copyright protection for computer screen
displays will force computer companies to make their screens
as complex and complicated as possible, so as not to copy an-
other company's screen display.172 The only user-friendly com-
puters will be those monopolized by the computer companies
who first copyrighted the user-friendly screen displays.
172. Bulkeley, supra note 16, at 37, col. 5 ("If they can't apply consistency, software
developers worry that they will have to design needlessly complex screens and in-
structions just to avoid other companies' copyrights. A keyboard is limited .... It
would be a sad day if you started copyrighting a limited number of keystrokes.").
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